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GERTRUDIS VAN DE VIJVER
Introduction
When Peirce stated that 'a sign ... is something which stands for
something to somebody in some respect or capacity' (Peirce 1897, in
Buchler 1955: 125), he clearly stressed its relational or triadic nature: if
there are 'signs of meaning in the universe' (cf. Hoffmeyer 1996), they are
always signs to someone, never signs as such. If signs stand for something,
they inevitably stand for something to somebody. In other words, the
sign-function has to be, implicitly or explicitly, recognized by someone;
systems have in some sense to 'realize' the sign-function. The Peircean
sign-conception is committed to a universe populated by dynamical,
'subjective', systems, i.e., beings that have developed some kind of
autonomy out of which they are able to take something as standing for
something else.
So, if we want to understand signifying practices in Peircean terms, it is
capital to understand (i) what makes systems into systems, (ii) how their
being systems leads to the capacity of realizing and/or recognizing the
sign-function, (iii) whether, and to what extent, our often intuitive,
human-centered understanding of the sign determines our understanding
of the workings of the sign-function in other types of systems.
Biosemiotics, defined as 'the study of informational, communicative
and semiotic aspects of living entities and processes' (as stated by
Emmeche and Hoffmeyer in the call for papers in the present issue),
argues that the above questions can, and have to be, pertinently and
coherently addressed for living systems in general. It incites us to
transgress the borders of human sign-practices and of human-centered
ways of understanding, by considering them as part of signifying practices
of living systems at large. However, it doesn't relieve us from the task of
understanding in what way human systems, as living systems, express,
specify, and particularize the kind of'sign-logic' that is supposed to be at
work in living systems. Nor does it relieve us from addressing the question
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of how the very specific human descriptional capacities came about and
how they come to frame any possible conception of the living.
In this article, I want to start from these questions, by asking in what
sense psychic, i.e., language-determined systems can be considered as a
particular type of living, signifying system. I aim at understanding what it
is for psychic systems, qua living systems, to realize the sign-function, and
what it is for them to genuinely recognize that something stands for
something else. Are there various ways of psychically realizing and/or
recognizing the sign-function? What are the developmental and systemic
or structural conditions leading to those capacities? Moreover, I want to
understand the relationship between realizing and recognizing the sign-
function for psychic systems. Is the recognizing a precondition for the
realizing or is it the other way around?
Psychodynamic structuralism (Freud 1950c, 1915e; Lacan 1966; Petitot
1985, 1990) as well as developmental and evolutionary systems theory
(Depew and Weber 1995; Griffiths 1994; Kauffman 1993; Salthe 1985,
1993; Van de Vijver et al. 1998) serve as my main background, but the
approach presented here is on many points convergent with the aims and
ambitions of the biosemiotic program. Indeed, if we agree (i) to consider
organizational closure as a minimal condition to be fulfilled for dynamical
systems to be stable, self-maintaining and self-producing,1 (ii) to conceive
of living systems in terms of intricate organizational closures that set the
stage for meaningful interactions (cf. Kauffman 1993; Maturana 1988;
Maturana and Varela 1980, 1987; Pattee 1995; Rosen 1985, 1991; Varela
1979), and (iii) to situate the psychological realm in continuity with this
viewpoint, then our task will be, minimally, to understand the status, the
meaning, and the implications of closure at the psychological level. What
can be meant by psychic closure? What makes psychic systems into
systems? What mechanisms are at work that lead initially biological sys-
tems to close themselves organizationally and to become psychic systems
of a certain kind? How do psychic systems acquire the possibilities of
entering into meaningful interactions?
I shall begin by putting into parallel the biosemiotic and the
psychodynamic point of view, illustrating the relevancy of interchanging
very specific questions between domains as apparently divergent as
biology and psychology, as well as highlighting the theoretical continuity
with regard to closure. The presentation is quite abstract and schematic,
and aims in the first place at suggesting and exploring new paths of
research. I will argue that the psychodynamic structuralist viewpoint, in
which mental phenomena are conceived of in materialistic, structuralist,
and dynamic terms, is in line with the biosemiotic approach to the living.
Next, I will discuss the meaning and the role of the mechanism of
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identification in the constitution of psychic closure. In my viewpoint, the
mechanism of identification is crucial in establishing any kind of psychic
closure; it is what makes psychic systems into systems of a certain kind,
because it involves the formation of a self-referential, i.e., closing judg-
ment. The different ways in which identification has worked in particular
histories leads to different types of psychic closure, and eventually to
different kinds of psychic structure. In their turn, psychic structures are
determinative for the signifying practices of the psychic system, qua living
system; they determine the scope and the nature of the interactions
considered as meaningful. In conclusion, I will ask whether identification
can have a meaning beyond the psychical realm, and formulate some
future paths of research along these lines.
Biosemiotics and psychodynamic structuralism
One of the main theses of biosemiotics, is that there is an intricate
relationship between what makes living beings living, and what makes
them into systems capable of acting and behaving in meaningful ways
(cf. Hoffmeyer 1996; Van de Vijver 1997). If living systems are able to
entertain meaningful interactions with an environment, it is because they
are living systems. In other words, if living systems are able to interpret
their surroundings, it is, minimally, because they are organizationally
closed systems. Closure provides them with a form of stability, protecting
them from being invaded or destroyed by stimuli of all kinds, and leaves
openness for new, potentially meaningful stimuli that arise from contacts
with the world. Moreover, closure provides the context from which to
interpret the surroundings.2
Evidently, the intricate linkages between openness and closure, their
multiple manifestations, their ingredients at various levels, and their
evolution and development need to be made precise at various levels of the
living. It is clear, also, that a central task for a biosemiotician will be to
account for the detailed systemic conditions within which meaningful
interactions can take place. Additionally, he will have to account for the
emergence of those systemic conditions. In other words, he will have to
explain the material conditions within which certain stable structures
come about and how they come to fulfill a constraining role for future
behavior and future development.3 And, last but not least, he will have to
address these questions with regard to living systems in general — i.e.,
indifferently of whether, for instance, animals or humans are con-
cerned — while situating them within the confines of the typically human
descriptional capacities.
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The advantages of the biosemiotic approach are manifold.
Firstly, it avoids addressing the question of 'what separates man from
the other animals' (cf. Diamond 1997) in largely implicit anthropo-
morphic terms. By analyzing the sources of the signifying practices in
living systems at large, these are no longer suddenly and mysteriously
belonging to 'higher' animals only.
Secondly, it avoids playing functionalist and semiotic arguments
against each other. In neo-Darwinian biological evolutionary theory, the
following move is quite common: from the moment the functional
evolutionary account can no longer be taken as plausible — some trait is
no longer useful in the light of reproductive success; it has become a
'functionally unnecessary luxury' — attention is turned to semiotic
arguments — i.e., arguments that refer to the signal- or sign-value of
things. In the biosemiotic approach, on the contrary, the biologically
functional and the semiotic are inseparable from the very beginning.4
Thirdly, in biosemiotics there is a quite logical connection between the
'signal-value' and the (evolutionary) intentional organization of the living
(cf. Hoffmeyer 1996: 47). Instead of relegating the Opportunity to design'
(cf. previous note) to specific types of living systems, and instead of
considering that only a few systems are capable of acting according to
'what they would want to be like', biosemiotics proposes an active,
constructive view of the living since its beginnings. The possibility of
constructing and/or embodying aims, whether consciously or not, is
intimately connected with the fact that living systems are anticipatory
from the very beginning. As a consequence, instead of sticking to an
externalist viewpoint — assessing the usefulness of certain traits on the
basis of functionalist criteria external to the system under observation —
an internalist viewpoint is likely to be much more appropriate in this
regard.5
Fourthly, the connection between the biologically and the semiotically
functional rests on the possibility of constructing socially meaningful
relations: there has to be, from the very start, an audience for a signal. If
the living is semiotic, sociality — however minimal — is present with the
living since its beginnings.6
Finally, by arguing for the hierarchical organization of the living — i.e.,
the hierarchical organization of closures through evolution and develop-
ment — biosemiotics cannot consider language, or culture, or any other
factor playing a developmental role at a certain level, as a kind of veneer.
The challenge here is to account for the developmental constraints that
had a determinative impact in the construction of the system. Those con-
straints cannot be considered as veneer in comparison with those at work
in underlying levels of organization. At each level appropriate paths of
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determination are formed, and each level functions accordingly. Nature
has, at various levels, ways of taking habits.7
The general message of biosemiotics thus goes as follows: first, under-
stand the developmental and evolutionary constraints at work at the
various levels in living systems, then define the types of determinations
that ensue, and finally, explain the concrete signifying practices on this
basis. In this way, it could be said that biosemiotics subscribes to a
generalized de-black-boxing of the living. Living beings cannot be faith-
fully dealt with on purely external grounds, they cannot be adequately
assessed when conceived of as entities 'frozen in the record' (Matsuno and
Salthe 1995). Living beings essentially develop and essentially subsist in
an interactionist, social context; they are from the very start signifying
beings; they are essentially defined on the basis of sign-practices in a social
context.
How can the psychodynamic structuralist approach be considered as a
specific instance of the biosemiotic program? In what sense are the ques-
tions it addresses basically similar to the biosemiotic questions as briefly
sketched above?
In psychodynamic structuralism, psychic phenomena are conceived of
in materialist, dynamic, and structural terms. The material aspect refers to
the fact that psychic phenomena are of a material nature and need to be
apprehended on the basis of specific, concrete mechanisms applicable to
material elements (cf. Freud 1950c [1895], 1915e; Lacan 1993 [1955-1956];
Van de Vijver 1998). The dynamic aspect refers to the fact that matter can
only be shaped through a particular developmental history. The struc-
turalist aspect refers to the more or less fixed results of this particular
history, the particular pathways that were formed, that continue to be
formed throughout a lifetime and that determine subsequent behavior.
The previously described connection between living, systems, and signi-
fying practices equally holds for psychic systems: if psychic systems, qua
living systems, are able to interpret their surroundings, it is because
they are organizationally closed systems. Closure provides them with
a form of stability that protects them from being invaded or destroyed
by stimuli of any kind, and leaves the essential openness for new
potentially meaningful stimuli that arise from contacts with the world.
Here also, closure provides the context from which to interpret the
surroundings.
If organizational closure generally refers, as we have seen, to the self-
referential organization of the causal interactions between certain
material elements, then the specificity of psychic closure will have to be
articulated (i) starting from a specification of the relevant material
elements, and (ii) on the basis of an explicitation of the specific
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mechanisms of closure at work in this context. The answers here will
depend upon what one considers as basically determinative in a psychic
developmental history, and are likely to differ with the variously proposed
viewpoints. For instance, there can be discussion about the nature of the
material elements: they can be considered as representations, as in the
Freudian tradition, as 'imagos' or as signifiers, as in the Lacanian point of
view.8 The point I want to focus on here, however, is their particular
organization and the mechanisms at play in that regard. But before
addressing that topic in more detail, let me stress the further similarities
between biosemiotics and psychodynamic structuralism.
As in living systems at large, it will be capital here also to analyze the
linkages between openness and closure, to describe their multiple mani-
festations, to analyze their ingredients at various levels, to account for
their evolution and development in terms of general principles and
mechanisms, and, of course, to always take into account the implications
of ourselves being living systems in describing the living. In this way, the
psychodynamic program instantiates the dynamics of the living, and
as such it involves, as is the case with any new hierarchical level of the
living, a new dynamics of interpretation. The major task of psycho-
dynamic structuralism is to define the relevant mechanisms, to explain the
typical constraints, and to describe the various modalities of psychic
being.
The advantages are quite similar to those enumerated for the bio»
semiotic program.
Anthropomorphism is less evident because no psychic structure can be
considered as representing the exquisite point of reference. The various
modalities of psychic structuration display, within their interactive domain,
the principles of their signifying practices. Anthropomorphism in this case
would mean that an interpretation is developed within one interactive
domain and is uncritically projected onto another domain, as if it
represented the absolute external viewpoint for all types of psychic
structures.
As in biosemiotics, the artificial cleavage between functional and semi-
otic arguments loses its pertinency, as the semiotic reasoning is applicable
to psychic systems, qua living systems, from the very beginning.
Moreover, the 'signal-value' of things is closely related to the intentional
organization of the psychic system.9 Psychodynamic structuralism proposes
an active, constructive view of the mental, and opens up to the idea that
psychic systems have a variety of ways, and a variety of degrees, of being
alive. In other words, one can be perfectly alive from a purely organismic
point of view, but barely alive mentally. There is a balance between open-
ness and closure to be specified in each case.
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Furthermore, sociality is crucial in the construction of psychic systems,
as well as in the development of socially meaningful relations. There has to
be, from the very start of psychic life, an audience for a signal. This aspect
has been acknowledged from different sides in psychology, but the precise
role of the other in the constitution and the signifying practices of
different psychic structures mostly remains to be made explicit.
Finally, it is relevant to think of the psychic system as embedded in the
hierarchical organization of the living, but also as hierarchically organized
itself. Language, or culture, or any other factor playing a developmental
role, can therefore never be considered as a kind of veneer. The challenge
here is to define the developmental constraints that had a determinative
impact in the construction of the psychic system. It will be those con-
straints that will allow us to understand the psychic system as a living
system of a particular kind. In this regard also, it is inspiring to think of
Table 1. Biosemiotics for biological and psychic systems
Biological systems
'signs stand for something to somebody
in some respect or capacity' (Peirce)
living systems
—types and stratification of closure
—types and stratification of openness
sociality
emergence of the code & emergence of the
organization of the code = triadic or relational
(cf. Hoifmeyer 1996)
multiple ways of being
multiple ways of interpreting, signifying,
remembering, forgetting, repeating and
inventing (cf. Hoifmeyer 1996)
inside and outside
what falls within the scope of the interactional
domain of the system is the inside
epistemological implications
role of the gap (cf. Hoffmeyer 1996)
Psychodynamically structured systems
'signs stand for something to a psychic
system in some respect or capacity'
psychic structures
—types and stratification of closures
—types and stratification of openness
sociality
emergence of the psychic
structure = triadic or relational
multiple ways of being
idem, cf. materiality of the signifier
(Lacan 1955-56), role of the record
(Matsuno & Salthe 1995), repetition
(cf. Reyniers & Van de Vijver, 1998)
inside and outside
what falls within the scope of the
interactional domain of the psychic
system, either symbolic and/or
imaginary, is the inside
epistemological implications
role of the gap in any description,
redoubled here by the identificatory
gap, related to grasping of one's own
being in a self-referential judgment
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the psychic system as a metabolism, or to speak of the metabolism of the
signifier (cf. Note 8).
Let me summarize the parallels between biosemiotics and psycho-
dynamic structuralism, and schematically anticipate the next section,
which deals with the constraints specifically at work in the constitution of
psychic systems, and in particular with the mechanism of identification
in psychic closure (see Table 1).
The mechanism of identification: A basic mechanism for psychic closure?
As we have seen, it is necessary to define the mechanisms at work in the
construction of psychic systems, and to make explicit the ways in which
psychic structures are determinative for particular signifying practices. My
aim here is to understand what it is for a psychic system to realize or to
recognize something as a sign in a Peircean sense, i.e., as something
standing for something to somebody in some respect or capacity. The
basic idea is that if psychic systems, qua living systems, are able to interpret
their surroundings, it is because they are organizationally closed systems.
So: what kind of mechanism is likely to be at work in psychic closure?
I have stated that closure refers to the self-referential organization of the
causal interactions between the relevant material elements. The hypothesis
I want to put forward now is that the mechanism of identification is the
basic mechanism in realizing psychic closure, and hence, the basic
mechanism at play in the development of signifying practices.
The following subtheses constitute the 'flesh' of the main hypothesis:
(i) the mechanism of identification is crucial in establishing any kind of
psychic closure; it is what makes psychic systems into systems of a
certain kind;
(ii) identification, by definition, concerns the formation of a self-
referential, i.e., closing judgment: it involves the internalization of
a specific external element, and thus installs a new level, or a new
order of being, the psychic level;
(iii) the self-referentiality involves an 'appropriation' and integration, or
a reorganization of elements of a lower level. Here, identification
(minimally) implies the appropriation of the biological, organismic
body, allowing the distinction between the biological and the
psychic to emerge;
(iv) identification can take place either imaginarily or symbolically:
the former concerns the identification with the image in the
mirror, it provides the unity of the body via its presentation in
the image; the latter concerns the identification with the signifier
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(Lacan 1977 [1964]); taking a signifier as standing for one's own
being in some respect, involves the internalization of the triadic
nature of the sign itself, leading to the recognition of the sign-
function interpreted in relational terms (see Note 8);
(v) only in some types of psychic systems is the distinction between
internal and external explicitly, i.e., symbolically, recognized; this
recognition is dependent upon the possibility of building symbolic
identifications;
(vi) the different ways in which identification has worked in particular
histories will lead to different types of psychic closure, eventually
leading to different kinds of psychic structure;
(vii) psychic structures are determinative for the signifying practices of
the psychic system, qua living system; they determine the scope of
the interactions considered as meaningful.
All these points would deserve a much closer analysis, theoretically as
well as practically, but it is impossible to deal with all of them in detail
here. I can only briefly indicate why and how this picture is plausible, how
it unifies some existing insights, again on a theoretical as well as on a
practical level, and what perspectives it contains for future research.
The internalization of an external element
Identification concerns the way in which a living being succeeds in
recognizing itself, in building a representation of itself, or in giving itself a
place in function of the outer world, on the basis of an interaction with his
surroundings (cf. Grunberger et al. 1978). As perceiving systems — the
'perceptual substance of the living organism', as Freud would call it
(1915c: 119) — living beings normally do not stand in a relation of
cognitive self-evidence to themselves. The element that is likely to reveal
to them their own nature is the constant stimulus. By identifying with the
constant stimulus, by recognizing itself in the stimulus, the organism
acknowledges his own unicity. This is what Rene Thorn and many etho-
logists, among them Lorenz and Eibl-Eibesfeldt, acknowledged when they
stated that the moment the predator chases the prey, the predator is the
prey. Along similar lines, when I say T, this does not just indicate my
organic individuality, but on the contrary it refers to the organic indi-
viduality as strictly equivalent to the mirror in which that organic
individuality is revealed.10
But the peculiarity of humans is that they are not just organisms. They
do not restrict themselves to imaginary identification. Humans are born in
language, and most of the time come to assume the idea that words can
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represent them, thereby immediately experiencing the inadequacy of words
as they can never fully represent them. Symbolic identification concerns the
identification with the signifier (Lacan 1977 [1964]), it involves taking a
signifier (trait unaire) as standing for one's own being in some respect.
In both imaginary and symbolic identification, however, one always
identifies with what one is not. Freud is very blunt on this point in the first
pages of Instincts and their Vicissitudes (1915c). His main idea is the
following: 'all that I can directly withdraw from, this is not me; on the
contrary, all that I cannot directly withdraw from, this is me' (Dalto 1998:
265). What I cannot escape, that is me. To Freud — and this is of
importance in view of the parallels we have been drawing between
biosemiotics and psychodynamic structuralism — this means that the
thing that I cannot escape, is a thing that stays together and impresses by
its constant structure. This thing can be me.
So, in saying that identification involves the internalization of an
external element, I don't mean to imply that the external element is
arbitrarily chosen. On the contrary, it must find its basis in the acknowl-
edgement of things that 'stay together as a thing'. Here, we encounter the
intimate link between identification and sociality. It is true that one
identifies with what one is not — internalization of an external element
— but one nevertheless identifies with somebody or something that is
perceived, however partially, as basically the same. To rephrase it in other
terms: one identifies with an organizationally closed system of a certain
kind. To identify, is to subscribe to the signifying practices of at least one
other being at the relevant level of organization.
The particular material conditions necessary for being in this way in
language, remain, however, highly mysterious. The fellow human being
and his way of being in language, are certainly determinative. It could be
interesting to consider the fellow human being in terms of perturbations
of the biological structure of the organism. The other perturbs in a more
or less drastic way the present biological rhythms; he perturbs the various
productions of the child by interpreting them, he perturbs the child by
being absent or present. Thus we have two interacting structures, one that
is in language in a particular way, the other that is not yet in language but
that is underinterpreted and at the same time overinterpreted. However,
it seems to me that we are far from having stipulated the conditions for or
the details of the mechanisms that are at work here.
Closure over the organismic body: Embodiment?
The general idea I present here mostly took shape while I was studying
various case studies of psychosis.11 In these cases, the difficulties of
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establishing imaginary as well as symbolic identifications go hand in hand
with the difficulties or peculiarities prevailing in the signifying practices.
As a matter of fact, the capacity for recognizing that something is a sign —
i.e., the capacity for recognizing that something can stand for something
else, and, by extension, that a sign can potentially stand for anything —
heavily relies on the ways in which one has succeeded in applying this
signifying practice to one's own being. The capacity for recognizing the sign-
function clearly requires the capacity for including one's own (organismic)
being in a self-referential, i.e., identificatory, closing judgment. The capac-
ity for recognizing the sign-function requires that one has unified, i.e.,
enclosed, his own body on the basis of a signifying judgment. A sign can
only be recognized as such when someone has succeeded in making a self-
referential judgment by which he takes a sign as something that stands for
him/herself in some respect or capacity. This is, according to me, the proper
way in which embodiment should be interpreted. In opposition to many
approaches in cognitive sciences, embodiment should not be seen as a
kind of sophistication or contextualization added after having developed
formal approaches of the mental, but has to be conceived of as a factor
included from the very start in the development of the mental and the
cognitive. If there are as yet no machines that possess embodied knowl-
edge, it is minimally because they haven't yet closed themselves by self-
referentially judging their own being.
In cases where a human being has not succeeded in signifying his own
being — in cases where he has not grasped himself as something that
'makes an impression by its constant structure and that stays together as
a thing' (cf. Freud 1950c [1895]: 331) — it can be shown that a sign is not
generally something that stands for something else to somebody in some
respect or capacity. It can be observed that most psychotic beings have
immense difficulties when in front of a mirror, because they are not able to
recognize themselves in it and consequently experience the image as a
major threat to their own being. Moreover, signs that are in any sense
related to the proper body are frequently considered as things with a
threatening character.12 Moreover, in those same cases, there is a marked
difficulty in treating one's own body as something that is in some sense
unified. There is no real sense of internal and external: time and again the
organismic body needs to be carved or mutilated to reassure the person in
question that he 'has' a body, an understanding that is quite far from
recognizing that he 'is' someone.13
If I may expand speculatively upon the idea of embodiment, I would
say that by realizing the self-referential judgment about one's own being,
one exquisitely subscribes to the dialectics of closure. The symbolic identi-
ficatory judgment implies the acknowledgment that language is a means
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of externalizing, i.e., a means of closing off the internal dynamics. As a
matter of fact, it implies that one has installed, within oneself, the means
of establishing a judgment that remains forever external to the proper
internal dynamics, by assuming that there is at least one sign that can
stand for the internal dynamics. This is what I mean when I say that, by
symbolic identification, the dialectics between inside and outside has been
internalized (cf. iv, v). But it also involves the internalization of the triadic
nature of the sign itself, because entering language implies that one
accepts the fundamental impossibility of making the word and the thing
coincide. As a means of externalizing, language is marked in a twofold
way by a fundamental gap. Firstly, the code itself is marked by a gap:
something escapes in any codification. In Signs of Meaning in the
Universe, Hoffmeyer (1996) beautifully describes this in terms of semiotic
freedom: precisely because it is based on exclusion, the code can create
semiotic freedom. Robert Rosen, and also Jacques Lacan arrived at very
similar conclusions in characterizing the modeling relation. Secondly,
there is a gap that arises once we introduce the idea of system or of
closure, and that redoubles the previous one. The gap here refers to the
impossibility of adequately describing the internal dynamics of living
systems, and the necessity, faute de mieux, to adopt an external, however
partially totalizing, viewpoint to account for it. It is a gap that, in the field
of evolutionary biology, leads to the difference between internalist and
externalist viewpoints (or the endo-exo discussions of which the main
proponents are Koichiro Matsuno, George Kampis [1991], and Harald
Atmanspacher [1996]). For human beings, this issue is precisely the one of
identification: how to know fellow human beings, or even fellow living
beings, when considering the fact that they are systems, and that it is
impossible to break them apart without destroying them as systems?
In summary, the way of being in language participates in the dialectics
of the living; it quite naturally, though not unambiguously, expresses the
way of being in the world, in a bodily, spatial, and temporal manner. The
biological is a reappropriation in language for beings who are produced in
and through language. I can paraphrase here Maxine Sheet-Johnstone's
statement: 'Animals are topological beings: they move as they shape and
they shape as they move' (Sheets-Johnstone 1996), as: 'Humans are topo-
logical beings: they speak as they shape and they shape as they speak'.
Conclusion
My presentation of identification as the basic mechanism in psychic
closure has been very schematic, abstract, and theoretical. The coherence
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and the pertinency of the approach evidently need to be further
elaborated, in the first place on the basis of clinical fragments, but also
on the basis of a study of the workings of closure at other biological levels.
It would indeed be interesting to see whether identification is only a
'window' for the understanding of closure at the psychic level, or whether
it has any implications for living systems at large. If biosemiotics claims
that there is sociality in the living from the very start, then why not
conceive of that sociality in terms of identificatory mechanisms even for
very primitive living beings?
Another interesting line of research would consist of studying the
dialectics between internal and external at various levels. What came out
so clearly in the case of psychic systems, is that a new level is only distin-
guished as such when it has in a sense been closed off, i.e., when one has
been expulsed from it by creating the closure over its material elements. In
this way, psychic beings, from the moment they have 'embodied' their
being, no longer have 'privileged' access to the kind of organismic unity as
we might suppose is the case in animals that didn't succeed in building
identificatory judgments. Insofar as we are language-determined systems,
and insofar as we are in language, we don't have privileged access to our
organismic unity. In speaking, one can have acquired a new kind, a
linguistic kind of body, un corps, as Lacan would have it. In more general
terms, the 'higher' level is not really a meta-perspective on the lower levels.
The higher level adds a new perspective, and provides us with external
viewpoints that, inevitably, remain inqgbquate to account for the internal
dynamics at play between the relevani^naterial elements. This does not
lead to a solipsism, as is sometimes advanced when dealing with organiza-
tional closure or autopoiesis (cf. Kampis 1991: 389, cf. Note 2). In our
argumentation, identification is a window on a world, but it is also a
creation of a world in which one is not solipsistically enclosed, but one in
which the conditions for understanding need to be, time and again,
created through interaction in a social context.
Notes
I use the concept of closure in a quite relaxed sense throughout the article: it refers to the
self-referential organization of material elements of a certain kind. More details and
a critical notice can be found in Note 2.
Closure has many meanings. Here, it abstractly refers to the self-referential organization
of the causal interactions in material systems, i.e., to the self-referential, recursive
organization of the causal loops that determine the particular dynamics at a certain level
(cf. Maturana and Varela 1980; Varela 1979). Organizational closure clearly does not
imply that the system under consideration is closed to energetic or material interactions.
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In this sense, my interpretation is faithful to Maturana's and Varela's interpretation of
closure, as it is embedded in their theory of autopoietic systems (Maturana and Varela
1980; Varela 1979). According to these authors, an autopoietic system is Organized
(defined as a unity) as a network of processes of production (transformation and
destruction) of components that produces the components that: (1) through their
interactions and transformations continuously regenerate and realize the network of
processes (relations) that produced them; and (2) constitute it... as a concrete unity in
the space in which they exist by specifying the topological domain of its realization as
such a network' (Varela 1979: 13). In this definition, the capacities of self-production
and self-maintenance of systems are stressed, and explicitly related to the specific
organization of the relations between their components. It is these capacities and the
organizational requirements underlying them that I am interested in here. The
epistemological difficulties traditionally linked to autopoietic systems theory, i.e., those
about their so-called solipsistic nature, or those about the nature of signs or
representations, considered as 'phenomena existing only in the domain generated by the
observer' (Maturana and Varela 1980: 132), are still subject for discussion. They merit
study in detail, at each relevant level, because the assumptions they involve are multiple
and make it impossible to bluntly state the problem in terms of logical incompatibilities.
Unfortunately, such an endeavor falls outside the scope of this article.
3. This is what makes the biosemiotic program so closely related to the dynamic
structuralist and basically materialist program of evolutionary systems thinking (cf. Van
de Vijver et al. 1998).
4. A small example might be helpful to illustrate the respective 'ranges' of the functionalist
and semiotic arguments in biological evolutionary theory. In 'What separates man from
the animals? Four inches and eleven minutes' (Diamond 1997), Jared Diamond deals
with the differences between human and animal sexuality, as well as with 'the evolution
of body signals of exaggerated size and confined to one sex, which serve as social
signals'. The article plays very much oirthe comical side of the affair, exploiting, among
other things, the difference in lengtfepK&een the human and the simian penis, and the
plausible explanations accounting for this difference. In this regard, the author writes
the following: 'The erect penis is about one-inch long in gorillas, one inch in orangutans,
but five inches in humans, even though male apes have much bigger bodies. Are those
extra inches a functionally unnecessary luxuryT And he goes on to answer: Ά hint that
the large human penis serves as some sort of signal is offered when men have the
opportunity to design their own penises, rather than remaining content with their
evolutionary legacy. Men in the highlands of New Guinea do that by enclosing the penis
in a decorative sheath called a phallocarp. The sheath is up to two-foot long and four
inches in diameter .... Each man owns several, varying in size, ornamentation and angle
of erection, and selects a different one each day, much as we select a shirt to wear. Asked
why they wore phallocarps, the tribesmen replied that they felt naked and immodest
without them. ... The phallocarp is in effect a conspicuous erect pseudo-penis
representing what a man would like to be endowed with' (italics added). We observe here,
as opposed to the biosemiotic viewpoint, that Diamond assumes a distinction between
the 'merely' functionally explainable and the semiotically explainable, and that he links
the latter with the possibility of design according to 'what one would like to be'.
5. For a more detailed account of the distinction between internalism and externalism, see,
for example, Matsuno (1996) and Van de Vijver (1996).
6. Quite to the contrary, Diamond holds that it is only with semiosis that we enter that
other kind of functionality, i.e., the social, interactive kind in which biologically useless
things can become, surprisingly, extremely useful. As a matter of fact, the article ends
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with a question about the 'intended audience' of the above 'proclamation of virility',
thereby opening up the issue of sociality. An easy answer is not to be expected, Diamond
says, but the tentative one we get here is the following, again based on an implicit
anthropomorphic move: 'Zoologists studying animals regularly discover that sexual
ornaments serve a dual function: to attract potential mates of the opposite sex and
establish dominance over rivals of the same sex'.
Again in opposition to this viewpoint, Diamond's article ends with: 'we humans still
carry the legacy of hundreds of millions of years of vertebrate evolution engraved deeply
into our sexuality. Over that legacy, our art, language and culture have only recently
added a veneer'.
According to Lacan, the imago is constitutive for the formation of the psychic system in
that it provides the image with which one identifies. For the role of the imagos in the
constitution of a psychic system, see 'Propos sur la causalite psychique' (Lacan 1946,
reprinted 1966). Surprisingly, in this text Lacan already speaks of closure when dealing
with the identification with the image, and in particular when focusing on the Oedipus
complex. He writes: 'Its value of closure [of the Oedipus complex] in a psychic cycle has to
do with the fact that it represents the family situation, which, by its institutional char-
acter, marks^ in the cultural realm, the crossing of the biological and the social' (Lacan
1966:184, my translation). (In French: 'sä valeur de clöture d'un cycle psychique tient a ce
qu'il represente la situation familiale, en tant que par son institution celle-ci marque dans
le culturel le recoupement du biologique et du social'.) This quote is particularly relevant
in the light of the biosemiotic interpretation of the living in basically social terms.
In addition to the imago, Lacan stresses the importance of the signifier. A signifier is by
him interpreted along the lines of Saussure's structuralism, with the basic difference that
he doesn't focus on the structure of language, but on the psychic structuration on the
basis of language. Here again, as we will see further, in this process of psychic structura-
tion, identification will play a crucial role. As a matter of fact, in symbolic identification,
or the identification with the signifier, the subject takes a signifier as representative for
his being, however partial that may be. I would say that the signifier is an expression of
the way in which the subject has 'categorized' his (mainly linguistic) surroundings in a
structuralist way. Signifiers can be words, or other kinds of linguistic material (mor-
phemes and phonemes), and as such they are particular organizations of the linguistic
material that have had a structuring impact on the subject. But they don't need to be
linguistic, as objects, relationships, and symptomatic acts can be signifiers as well.
Crucial for a signifier is its material nature, which refers to its indivisibility. This makes
it into the building block of psychic organization, which is conceived of accordingly in
material terms. Whereas Lacan conceived of the signifier as something that is inscribed
in a system and which takes on a psychic value purely by virtue of its difference from the
other elements (Saussure's interpretation of structure), I believe it is interesting to
attempt conceiving of psychic structure along the biosemiotic lines we have been
sketching, that is, as a living, organizationally closed system. That is why it is interesting
to conceive of the psychic system as a 'metabolism of the signifier', a metaphor that was
used by Jean Guir (1998). In this endeavor, it is crucial to arrive at a clear definition of
psychic organization or structure, which is what the present article sets out to do. For
the role of the signifier in the work of Lacan, various works can be mentioned. Apart
from the text above, see Lacan (1961-1962); Evans (1996).
This holds for the conscious 'part' or functioning of the psychic system, as well as for the
unconscious. In this regard, interesting analogies have been brought to light between
Freud's and Brentano's approaches to intentionality. (Cf. Cohen 1998.)
I was much inspired here by the article by Sylvana Dalto (1998).
Brought to you by | New York University Bobst Library Technical Services
Authenticated
Download Date | 6/1/15 8:26 AM
628 G. Van de Vijver
11. Many cases could be mentioned here, but one has been particularly revealing to me,
namely, that of little Herbert, described by Edita Sterba at the beginning of the century
(cf. Sterba 1933a and b).
12. Beautiful examples of words being considered as things are provided by the psychotic
little boy named Herbert: Ί can't eat "whipped cream", because otherwise, I will be
whipped', or, Ί need a first-class ticket, because I am a first-class boy', or else Ί don't
want to put on the green coat, I am a big boy, and I don't want to be a frog, I don't want
to put on the green coat' (cf. Sterba 1933a and b, my translation).
13. I cannot resist citing a few of the many remarkable linguistic fragments in the case of
Herbert, because they illustrate so well that the ways of psychic being are instantiating
the dynamics of the living. Herbert says: Only living things have a name, things that live
and that can be killed'. How remarkable that he grasps the fact that living things have
a very peculiar status, that it is those things that have a special relation to names.
Herbert says something similar in an even more explicit way: One cannot just have a
name, one has to be someone, otherwise one cannot live. Therefore, I refuse to say my
name, I shall only pronounce my name when I am someone. I want to be alive and
grown-up. All adults have a name and are something. I am not the Herbert. Mama just
says this; that is only my name, I know, I am really the wagon-manufacturer' (Sterba
1933a: 17, my translation; italics in the original).
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